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This Draft: August 15, 2012 
Abstract 
Even with many decades of experience with booking and reservations, managers in the hotel industry still 
face substantial challenges predicting future room demand. Using a general equilibrium approach, this 
paper provides a new reservation pricing method. By establishing a price for the reservation that is based 
on the traveler’s best estimate of whether she will actually occupy the room, the hotelier gains 
information about how likely it is that the room will be sold. The price of the reservation increases as the 
traveler’s certainty of travel increases. At the same time, the room rate decreases according to likelihood 
that the traveler will actually occupy that room. This approach therefore provides a mechanism by which 
hotel managers can obtain more accurate information regarding future room demand and potential guests 
can gain a more favorable rate in exchange for revealing the critical information regarding their trip. With 
this information, the hotel can focus its revenue management system more sharply and does not have to 
rely solely on historic ratios to predict room occupancy.  
 
1. Introduction 
The service industry has long used reservations as a sales technique, with the idea that once a 
user has booked a service (e.g., a hotel room, flight ticket) for a particular date, that service has a 
high certainty of being sold. Current practices pertaining to the reservation method vary among 
different businesses. Airlines and theaters require advance purchase of tickets, and many of these 
tickets are non-refundable or charge a significant penalty for modification or cancellation. Most 
restaurants and car-rental companies charge no penalty for no-show reservations. However, a 
majority of hotels and motels offer free reservations, subject to a 24-hour cancellation rule.
2
  
The importance of reservation systems to the lodging industry is shown first by Westin’s 
development of the Hoteltype reservation system in 1947and by the development of the Inter-
Hilton Hotel Reservation System in 1948, which allowed guests to telephone for immediate 
confirmation of availability (albeit two months in advance), (see Ahla.com, 2011; Hilton.com, 
2011). Computer-based reservations entered the picture in the late 1950s and 1960s. Sheraton 
developed an automated electronic reservation system in 1958, and Holidex operated on 
mainframe computers in the 1960s to allow Holiday Inn guests to reserve a room without a 
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 Please address comments to Peng Liu, 465 Statler Hall, Ithaca NY 14853, pl333@cornell.edu (Tel:) 607-2566818. 
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 A potential customer can book a hotel room any time before the specified date of stay with no charge as long as 
there is availability. She can cancel the reservation without penalty 24 hours before the specified date. A one day 
room rate will be charged if the customer cancels the reservation after the deadline has past.  
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phone call. Choice Hotels is credited as the first chain to offer real-time reservations on its 
website (Ahla.com, 2011, choicehotels.com, 2011). Thus, we see that a reservation system is a 
core operating feature of hotel chains and referral systems. 
However, even with many decades of experience with booking and reservation, managers 
in hotel, airline, rental car, and other service industries still face substantial challenges. With 
regard to cancellations and no shows, Smith 1992 documents that the combination of 
cancellations and no-shows involve 50 percent of American Airlines reservations and 
cancellation rates of 30 percent or more are not uncommon today for airlines. Marcus and 
Anderson 2006 report that the car rental industry has cancellation rates in the range of 20 to 30 
percent. As hospitality operators seek to offset this toll by overbooking, their policies, however, 
are imperfect and often leave travelers and guests unsatisfied. Numerous other studies (e.g., 
Liberman and Yechiali 1978, Rothstein 1974, 1985, and Bitran and Gilbert 1996, among others) 
have documented the problems in hospitality demand management resulting from reservation 
cancellation and overbooking practices. The major reason for such dissatisfaction is related to the 
difficulty of predicting future demand in the hospitality industry.  
Understanding the guest’s potential demand dynamics is crucial for service operators. 
Taking the example of a hotel, to cover the hotel’s significant fixed costs, the hotel needs at least 
a certain portion of rooms occupied by the guests. On the other hand, due to fixed capacity, the 
hotel cannot necessarily satisfy all booking requests. If the hotel uses its historical cancellation 
and no-show information to overbook the property, any guests who are subsequently not 
accommodated will be dissatisfied, to say the least. Therefore, obtaining precise information 
regarding what percentage of reservations will be honored by the guests is important and 
valuable to the provider. Current practice of estimating future room demand based on historical 
booking information has become more and more inefficient due to market competition, 
complexity of distributional channels, price transparency, and communication convenience. The 
inefficiency of current demand management tools has been intensified by the recent financial 
crisis (Kosova and Enz 2012) when budget concerns and travel uncertainty due to business needs 
have expanded. The hospitality industry calls for new approaches that can do a better job 
predicting service demand while simultaneously providing enough incentives to attract 
customers (Kimes 2010, Cross, Higbie and Cross 2009). In this paper, I propose a new 
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reservation method that could provide hoteliers more accurate prediction of future demand. As 
the distinctive feature, this approach is forward-looking.  
The reservation to occupy a hotel room for a particular night is valuable to both the 
potential guest and the hotel. For the guest, a reservation is the promise of a room on a certain 
date at a certain price. That said, under current practice, the guest in most cases can cancel that 
reservation without penalty in accordance with the hotel’s policies. In effect, the hotel has 
granted the guest a future option with regard to a room, but only the guest knows the likelihood 
that the room will actually be occupied. Reservations are important to hotel operators in many 
ways. The quantity of reservations gives a hotel operator valuable information about potential 
demand, so that the operator can plan ahead to achieve the best capacity utilization. With 
predicted future room demand, the hotel can apply yield management tools to adjust the hotel 
rate with a goal of achieving higher revenue. Such yield management tools include marketing 
initiatives, promotion campaigns, and selling to a third party agency such as Priceline or 
Travelocity. 
In contrast to earlier eras, access to the internet and hotels’ real-time inventory allows 
guests to make a reservation and then continue to search for a lower price accommodation. A 
study by Thompson and Failmezger 2005 found numerous price disparities among various 
reservation channels, which would abet such search practices. While hotel chains may have 
made progress on price consistency, the key point here is that reservations usually price both the 
right and benefit of a reservation as a bundle. In this regard, the value of a reservation is 
contained in the price of the service product. In contrast to this practice, Quan 2002 and Carvell 
and Quan 2008 argued that a reservation is, in fact, a valuable option, which should be priced 
separately from the service.
3
 They show that for price-sensitive customers hotel reservations are 
analogous to financial call option contracts written by the hotel and given to the guests.  
However, the above mentioned reservation pricing method does not determine the value 
of a reservation from the standpoint of the provider’s profit function or from the consumer’s 
utility function, which is what the economists call ―a partial equilibrium.‖ This paper fills the 
gap in the literature and prices the reservation option using the ―general equilibrium approach,‖ 
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 Quan 2002 argues that “reservations can provide a form of price insurance which consumers can use to “lock in” 
a price for the future delivery of the service. When there is future price uncertainty, such a commitment is costly to 
reservation issuers.” Carvell and Quan (2008) extend the option pricing methodology and value some exotic 
reservations. 
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in which I jointly solve the maximization problems of both the provider and the guest. I further 
compare the differences between the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium approach in 
section 2. For convenience of presentation, I perform the analysis and give examples in the 
context of the lodging industry with the transient segment as the target customers. With 
modifications, however, the pricing methodology and analytical results are applicable to other 
segments and other service industries as well. Section 3 discusses such applications and provides 
some managerial implications.  
 
2. The Value of a Hotel Reservation – A General Equilibrium View   
To demonstrate the necessity and benefit of the general equilibrium approach to hotel 
reservations, let us first examine the limitations of the partial equilibrium method. The partial 
equilibrium studies consider a group of travelers who are indifferent with respect to which hotel 
they book. They consider a market with numerous commoditized hotels each offering rooms of 
comparable utility. The reservation in such a model is similar to a financial option. With a room 
reservation in hand at a known rate, the guest obtains the right to search for cheaper hotels in the 
same destination. In fact, an important result of the partial equilibrium approach, as Quan 2002 
stated, is that ―if all future rates are perfectly predictable, or that there is no unpredictable 
component to future prices, the reservation option has no value.” This is contradictory to the 
industry wisdom: Even though the service rate is fixed or the volatility of the room rate is zero, 
the value of reservation should still be positive, because providers still find the reservations 
valuable for services scheduling.
4
  
Table 1 distinguishes in detail the general equilibrium approach from partial equilibrium 
approach to hotel reservations. In contrast to the partial equilibrium perspective, which claims 
that reservation is pure cost for the provider, a general equilibrium approach views that price of a 
reservation and price of a hotel room are jointly determined by the market where providers and 
guests maximize their respective utilities.
5
  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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 In finance literature, we know that the standard option pricing formula developed for financial assets (e.g., Black 
and Scholes) is not appropriate for pricing the perishable goods and services. Because one cannot re-sell or sell short 
the hotel rooms and other service products the same way as to common stocks and other financial assets.  
5
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The general equilibrium approach for a hotel reservation mechanism proposed in this 
article generates a positive reservation price even if the hotel rate does not change. I show that 
the limited availability of hotel rooms and the uncertainty of whether the traveler will actually 
need to occupy the room are the key components to valuing the reservation, factors which are 
especially relevant to transient travelers with some level of budget concerns. This model takes 
these two factors into account: travelers have a certain level of concern that the resource (i.e., the 
hotel room) will not be available when they need it, but they also have a certain level of 
uncertainty that they actually will occupy the reserved room. Under the general equilibrium 
approach, the reservation option is priced by jointly solving the utility maximization problems of 
both a potential guest and the provider. Unlike a partial equilibrium approach, which yields a 
unique solution from the Black-Scholes option pricing model, the general equilibrium approach 
provides a range of prices that satisfy the following two conditions: (1) to achieve the profit 
maximization for the service provider (the hotel); and at the same time (2) to provide sufficient 
incentives for customers to use this method. While the solution is not unique, within a narrow 
range, the hotel manager can provide a pricing scheme based on her pricing power and market 
strategies.  
 
2.1 The Theoretical Framework 
Assume every guest has a constant but different private value vi of staying in a hotel on a 
particular future date T. At the present date t=0, the probability that the guest needs the hotel 
room at T is pi. The demand distribution is characterized by a probability density function f(p; v). 
Each day before date T, potential guests are given a menu of prices for the hotel services. The 
hotel service price has two components: a non-refundable reservation price, r, to be paid at 
reservation date t=0 and a hotel room rate, h, to be paid at check-in date T, if and only if she 
consumes the hotel service at T.
6
 Therefore if the guest shows up at T, her total hotel expense is 
r+h; while she will lose r if she changes her mind and does not occupy the hotel room at T. 
Therefore, the expected revenue the hotel receives from each guest is r+hpi. Since only the guest 
(not the service provider) knows private value and travel likelihood, I call the combination (vi, pi) 
at date 0 private information. The consumer makes her reservation by selecting the reservation 
price-room rate pair, (r, h). Any date before date T, the price schedule is subject to change and 
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room rate and reservation fee depend on check-in date as well as when she makes the reservation.  
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the guest can update her probability of occupying the room, by changing the reservation and 
paying the corresponding fees. The pricing schemes are determined by the monopoly provider 
(i.e., the hotel) who aggregates all information from potential guests. To emphasize the 
importance of reservation pricing, let’s focus for now on the case that each client knows her 
probability of service needs when she makes the reservation. To highlight the importance of 
demand uncertainty (rather than hotel rate uncertainty), we assume the room rate does not 
change during the period between the reservation and check-in date.  
The guest maximizes her expected utility over consumer surplus by reporting a 
consumption probability qit at any time before check-in date T, subject to her constraints.  
 
    
     
0
max                                                (1)
    0,                             (2)
it
T
it it t it it t it
q
t
t it it t it it it
E p v r q p h q
subject to r q p h q p v for t T

   
   

 
The guest’s consumer surplus is the difference between the expected utility of consuming the 
hotel service using the guest’s true probability (pit), it itp v  and the expected total expense she 
selected at the reservation based on her reported travel probability (qit),    t it it t itr q p h q   , 
provided that the expected consumer surplus is non-negative. The reported likelihood of business 
need is equivalent to choosing an r-h pair offered by the hotel, which is a function of qit. 
 The provider’s problem is illustrated as follows: The hotel maximizes the sum of 
expected potential guests’ revenue subject to its capacity constraint C. For the purpose of this 
example, assume there is a monopoly hotel provider in this market.
7
 With modifications, my 
model can be generalized to the setting with other market structures.  
 
       
 
,
0
max ,              (3)
  ,                                                            (4)
it it
T
t it it t it q p
r h
t
E r q p h q I f p v dpdv
subject to f p v dpdv C
 

 
    
 



 
where f(p,v) is demand distribution from potential guests and  
it itq p
I   is the benefit of 
improved operational management. 
it itq p
I   is an indicator function, which equals one if the hotel 
obtains the consumer’s private travel probability via this reservation method. In other words, the 
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all other hotels are fully booked and this is the only property with availability.  
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information benefit  I is positive if and only if the customer reports the true travel probability, 
i.e., q pit it . The benefit can be regarded as the implicit value of obtaining the true information 
about guests’ check-in probability from their reservations.8 With accurate future demand 
information, the hotel can better manage room inventory and adjust (potentially increase) the 
room rate to reflect current demand. The dynamic nature of room rate (similar to airlines) will 
reinforce the necessity of using this reservation method, because the benefit of doing so has 
increased. Additionally, the hotel can adjust marketing and promotion intensities according to the 
revealed demand information. The above proposed method will be more attractive than the 
typical overbooking practice using historical booking and cancellation information. Therefore, 
this method will provide the most price integrity and lead to better customer satisfaction.  
 
2.2 An Illustration of the General Equilibrium Results 
A general equilibrium is solved by jointly maximizing the functions (1) and (3) above. Instead of 
formally deriving the equilibrium solution, I describe the common features of the results. In 
addition, a numerical example is provided to offer the implications. Let’s look at a concrete 
example of a consumer’s travel plan, Amy. Table 2 lays out Amy’s business decision and hotel 
reservation timeline. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Assume that, on January 1, 2013, Amy is planning a business trip to the New York City 
and will stay one night on June 1, 2013. However, the trip (thus the need for a hotel room) 
depends on whether her business proposal is selected by her client, who will not decide until 
April 1, 2013. According to past bidding experience, the likelihood that the guest’s proposal is 
selected is only about 10 percent. Once the proposal is chosen, though, Amy will need to make 
the trip and stay in the chosen hotel on June 1, 2013. Amy is concerned that there will be no 
available rooms (or the price will be too high) if she waits until April 1, 2013, to book the room, 
when the likelihood of travel is more certain.  
Table 3 provides a pricing scheme (r-h pairs) that satisfies the general equilibrium 
equations (1) – (4) and provides an incentive for Amy to book on January 1, 2013, for her 
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potential hotel need on June 1, 2013. Even though the travel probability is small (10 percent) in 
January, there is a benefit to lock in a hotel rate early to secure a room and then update the 
likelihood later, on April 1, 2013, when the travel need becomes certain. In the example, the 
room rate with a free reservation is $200 for the specified date, and the lowest non-refundable 
rate is $50 for the same room. If only the two choices in the shaded columns in Table 3 are 
available (which is current practice by most hotels), Amy is not offered any discount for booking 
the room early, and she will probably do one of the following. Amy can either wait until she is 
relatively certain of her trip to make a non-refundable reservation (probably on April 1, or even 
closer to the check-in date), because Amy has only a 10-percent estimated probability. Or 
alternatively, if Amy is concerned about room availability on June 1, 2013 (e.g., peak season in 
that market), she can initiate a regular reservation, which allows her pay nothing up front to 
secure a room at $200. Amy can cancel the reservation if her business proposal is turned down. 
However, as long as she can cancel it before May 31, 2013, there is no charge. Therefore, Amy 
has no incentive to cancel it early, even though she will know the travel need on April 1. Either 
way, the traditional reservation option fails to provide the hotel manager accurate information 
about Amy’s likelihood of arrival. Let’s now add the availability of reservation plans as 
demonstrated in the unshaded columns in Table 3 by which Amy can book early at a reduced 
rate and pay $1 for the reservation based on 10-percent probability. If Amy finds out that she 
does not need the hotel room, she loses only $1. However, if she takes the trip and stays in the 
hotel, she pays the lower room tariff of $180. Therefore, her total cost is $181 (disregarding any 
issues surrounding the time value of money). The reservation approach also allows Amy to 
update her probability later and in the case of increased travel probability, and enjoy a total cost 
as low as $51.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
This pricing scheme is optimal for both parties. Guests are rewarded for reporting their 
true travel probabilities by choosing the r-h pairs, and the hotel gains the benefit of the guests’ 
revealing their private information (regarding travel plans). In general, as demonstrated in Figure 
1, the reservation price is an increasing function of demand probability. The greater the certainty 
that a guest will stay in the hotel, the higher the price she should pay for (the option of) a 
reservation, as this way the total cost of the combined reservation and hotel room rate is smaller. 
The room rate, on the other hand, is a decreasing function of demand probability. The higher the 
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price paid by a guest for the reservation, the lower should be her room rate. Therefore, the 
combined cost is a decreasing function of demand probability.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
2.3 The Economic Significance  
The reservation strategy offered in this study can be also regarded as another way to segment 
customers based on their need and willingness to pay. The approach that I offer here is supported 
by the economics concept of price differentiation or price discrimination, which refers to the 
practice of charging different guests different prices for the same goods or services to maximize 
revenues. Let’s compare the pricing scheme proposed in this study with the classic textbook 
illustration of price discrimination. Figures 2 compares the potential revenues generated from 
three methods. The horizontal axis is the hotel room rate, while the vertical axis is number of 
rooms demanded. Panels a and b demonstrate how using traditional rate fences can improve 
hotel revenue (see also Carroll 2011 and Hanks, Cross, and Noland 2002).
 
When a hotel offers a 
single room rate (e.g., $100) for all transient travelers,
9
 it only captures revenue of $5,000 (50 
rooms x $100 per room), as shown in the shaded area of Figure 2-a. The white space in that 
graph represents unrealized revenues from those potential customers that are willing to pay more 
than $100 (uncollected willingness-to-pay) or are willing to pay less than $100 (and so don’t 
book, leaving some rooms unfilled).   
[Insert Figure 2-a and 2-b around here] 
 
 Figure 2-b illustrates the practice of using fences to distinguish potential customers. The 
hotel room rates can be classified (from the lowest to the highest) as discount rate, leisure tourist 
rate, corporate rate, business rate, and retail or premium rate. For simplicity, I assume the five 
rate fence categories separate the market equally with each demanding 20 rooms. When a hotel 
offers several room rates, the realized revenue in the Figure 2-b increases to $10,000 (20 x 
($50+$75+$100+$125+$150)), which is double the captured revenue using a single rate. 
Intuitively, the white space representing forgone revenue is smaller in this graph.  
The economics of demand and supply requires that hotels should utilize different rates to 
maximize profit or at least to cover the property’s large fixed cost. Even though the rate fence 
strategy has received wide acceptance, hoteliers still face a challenge regarding how to 
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appropriately segment customers while improving price integrity. While rational ways of 
segmenting consumers such as fences and packages are conceptually easy to understand, 
implementing such pricing schemes crucially relies on the ability to identify a consumer’s 
willingness to pay. Revenue managers use past behavior for this purpose, and must use historical 
data to infer consumers’ current business needs. The approach presented in this article provides a 
way to identify consumers’ needs by rewarding travelers who reveal their business needs and 
probability of travel. By submitting an r-h pair at the hotel reservation, the potential guest reveals 
her likelihood of travel at the time of booking. The rate selected naturally segments the market 
and displays customers’ willingness to pay. Therefore, rates can be continuous or as fine as the 
operator wants to set them, while concurrently maintaining pricing integrity. Figure 2-c 
illustrates the revenue improvement by subdividing the market even further than typical current 
fences. The horizontal axis is the total room rate expense, which is determined by both the 
reservation price r and room rate at check-in h. The vertical axis going down is the probability of 
the hotel need that potential travelers need to select. The vertical axis going up shows the number 
of rooms demanded. For the convenience of presentation, I again assume the market is 
segmented equally by the probability that travel will occur. The realized revenue under this 
pricing approach will increase to $15,516 (12*($50+$60+$72+$85+$98+$112+$128+$145+ 
$162+$181+$200)), which is more than triple the captured revenue using a single rate. 
Intuitively, the white space in that graph is even smaller than in the first two.  
[Insert Figure 2-c around here] 
 
3. Managerial Implications 
Although hotels and other service firms rarely charge guests expressly for the privilege of 
placing a reservation, they have already moved toward a system that accounts for guests’ 
willingness to pay and likelihood of occupying the room. For example, rate fences, 
nonrefundable reservations, and other practices such as requiring a deposit for group businesses 
reflect a market awareness of such option value of a reservation. How do those industry practices 
relate to the pricing method proposed above? How might consumers react to the proposed 
pricing structure? In reality, is it likely that the business traveler will pay that much heed to the 
hotel rate anyway? Furthermore, how would one implement such a reservation scheme for hotels 
with complex distribution channels? When implementing the pricing strategy, what are the 
11 
 
implications of the proposed approach for the architecture of revenue management system and 
under market competitions? These questions are answered in this section. 
 
3.1 Relationship Between Current Industry Practice and the Proposed Method 
A typical reservation offer from a New York hotel is shown in Figure 3. The webpage snapshot 
displays a hotel room search for a Sheraton Hotel in New York. The search for room availability 
of a check-in date of 10/1/2011 and for a specific bed type (1 queen bed) results in four matches 
with different room features (including a service package with parking and breakfast) and 
different cancellation policies. Clearly, these four hits show different products with different 
rates.  
[Insert Figure 3 around Here] 
The top two products – products 1 and 2, which are identical except for the cancellation 
policy, typify two products commonly used in the hospitality and service industry. Product 2 
(with a room rate of $359.00) contains the traditional reservation terms. If the guest cancels 
before 6:00 PM local time on the night before arrival (that is, 09/30/2011), there is no penalty. If 
the guest cancels after 6:00 PM local time on 09/30/2011, however, the guest forfeits the cost of 
a one-night stay. Product 1 (with a room rate of $323.10), representing one example of a recent 
trend in hotel rate discounting, is an advance-purchase product similar to what has long been 
used by the airline industry. Although it is only about 10-percent cheaper than product 2, product 
1 requires a nonrefundable, full prepayment at booking. Thus, this product does not allow for 
changes or cancellation. If the guest cancels the reservation, the forfeiture amount will be 100 
percent of the amount paid.  
The two reservation products described above can be regarded as the two extreme cases 
in the reservation pricing approach proposed in this paper. At one extreme, when the probability 
of the room being rented is almost zero the r-h pair values show that the reservation is free and 
the guests pay for hotel room only (perhaps a higher walk-in rate, if they do not end up 
canceling). At the other extreme, when the probability that the room will be sold equals one, the 
r-h pair shows this as a situation where guests make an advance purchase and pay the full 
amount at the time of the reservation (perhaps paying nothing or a much lower room rate in 
consideration that their reservation cannot be refunded). If hotels price products between those 
12 
 
two extremes they can allow more flexibility for guests and a wider variety of room rates. By 
extending the common practices of the above two cases, the hotels are able to capture more 
potential guests, especially those whose likelihood of using the service is small. More 
importantly, by aggregating the potential room demand for a give date, the hoteliers can focus its 
revenue management system more sharply and do not have to rely solely on historic ratios for 
room occupancy. 
 
3.2 Customer Perception and Implementation under Multi-distribution Channels  
More than ever before, hotel customers embrace innovations. Smartphone apps and online search 
and booking make reservations fast and convenient. The concept of paying a fee to gain value in 
conjunction with a reservation is no longer as alien as it was ten years ago. Due to this method’s 
financial incentives (significant room rate discount by various travel probabilities) and 
modification flexibilities, consumers should welcome this paper’s proposed reservation method 
as well. Nowadays, consumers have become used to dynamic changes in prices and yield 
management innovations, primarily in the airline industry. A recent example of an option-like 
reservation is FareLock introduced by Continental Airlines in 2010. (United Airlines has 
continued this practice following its merger with Continental.) For a non-refundable fee, 
FareLock service guarantees the itinerary and fare for 72 hours or 7 days depending on how 
much the consumer pays for the reservation option. I would expect that consumers would not 
resist such an innovation if it is introduced into hotel industry. 
The reservation approach introduced in section 2 demonstrates how the method works in 
a controlled scenario in the transient segment. Hotel markets are competitive and complex, filled 
with third-party distributors and online travel agents (OTAs). Hotels have been actively involved 
in multi-channel distribution using a combination of traditional and electronic channels such as 
Expedia, Travelocity, Priceline, Orbitz, and Hotwire (Thompson and Failmezger 2005, Kimes 
and Kies 2012). PhoCusWright reports that the room revenue booked online has been increasing 
steadily since 1998, and reached 30 percent in 2010 (Carroll 2011). The industry has long 
recognized the complexity and inter-relationships among multi-distribution channels and other 
hotel segments. It has attracted a lot of attention in the academic literature as well. Anderson 
2011, 2009, Kimes and Kies 2012, Enz, Canina and Noone 2012 are good sources of this type of 
research.  
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The proposed reservation pricing approach works well in competitive markets. 
Essentially the two corner prices (non-refundable room rate and free reservation rate) are 
determined by the market’s competitive forces. The hotel operator using the reservation pricing 
method can charge the same price as its competitors for the two corner scenarios. Additionally, 
the hotel can offer more prices in between, which will attract more consumers thus potentially 
increase its market share. An important advantage of the proposed pricing method is that the 
hotel operator can set its own prices in a sliding scale according its pricing power and marketing 
strategy while preserving its competitive position against existing rivals.  
The reservation pricing strategy also works well with OTAs and other third-party 
intermediaries. In fact, I would argue it would be easier for OTAs and third parties to adapt this 
new pricing tool, because OTAs have a clear business model and often lead service innovations. 
Recall that in the model, three basic input parameters are necessary to implement the proposed 
reservation method: number of rooms (capacity), non-refundable rate (price 1), and free 
reservation rate (price 2). For a third-party agent, the capacity can be the total number of rooms 
under management, while price 1 can be determined as the cost of acquiring the inventory or 
carrying cost, and price 2 will be the cost plus some desirable profit margin depending on each 
agent.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Widely used in the hospitality and other service industries, a reservation as an option secures the 
availability of the service and grants the purchaser the right to search lower-price alternatives. 
However, by issuing the reservation option, the service provider obtains valuable information 
about the consumers’ demand, which in turn helps to improve the provider’s revenue 
management. The price of a reservation under the general equilibrium framework developed in 
this paper is determined jointly by maximizing the utilities of the potential user and the service 
provider. Using hotel reservations as an example, I show that if a reservation is priced separately, 
the guest can pay for the right to gain a lower room rate, while the hotel gains an indication of 
the guest’s knowledge regarding whether the room will actually be occupied.  
A key distinguishing feature of the general equilibrium reservation pricing approach is 
that it considers the uncertainty of whether the traveler will actually need to occupy the room. 
Two common reservation patterns currently used in the lodging industry represent the two 
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extreme cases of reservation pricing approach proposed in this paper. The reservation that may 
be freely canceled carries a reservation charge of zero, while the non-refundable purchase 
effectively represents a fully prepaid reservation. By the same token, the guest has effectively 
indicated a 100-percent probability that the room will be occupied. The reservation pricing 
method proposed in the study expands the spectrum from the two extreme cases and aggregates 
the guests’ private information regarding lodging demand.  
(Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Glenn Withiam for copyediting this manuscript) 
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Table 1: Comparison of general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approach to hotel reservation
 General Equilibrium Approach 
(This Study) 
Partial Equilibrium Approach 
(Quan 2002, Carvel and Quan 2010) 
 
Pricing Method 
 
The value of reservation is priced separately from 
hotel room rate as a real option 
 
The value of reservation is priced separately from 
hotel room rate  as a financial option 
 
Room Rate Jointly determined with reservation price  
 
Exogenously given  
 
Value to the Hotelier  
 
Obtain valuable information about true probability of 
consumer needs. Hotelier can change room rate 
according to real time inventory and adjust marketing 
and promotion strategies 
 
Reservation options are issued at the provider’s cost. 
The value is computed based on the customer’s right 
to search for lower hotel rates 
 
Value to the Guests 
 
Financially rewarded for revealing true probability of 
hotel demand and flexible in revising the probability  
 
Lock in a price and obtain a right to search for 
cheaper room rates 
Benefit to Guests with Small 
Demand Probability 
 
Encouraging guests with small demand probability  
 
No difference in terms of guest demand probabilities 
Impact of Room Rate 
Volatility  
 
The reservation value is still positive even if the room 
rate does not change 
 
No value if room rate does not change (zero 
volatility) 
Uniqueness of Reservation 
Value 
Non-unique value  
Reservation value is priced in a narrow range under 
the general equilibrium. The hotelier determines the 
reservation fee structure based on the provider’s 
pricing power and marketing strategy 
 
Unique value which is determined by Black-Scholes 
option pricing model 
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Table 2: Time table of hypothetical consumer – Amy’s business need and hotel reservation plan 
 
       
       
Time Line       t = 0 t = 1                           t = T 
Example January 1, 2013 April 1, 2013  June 1, 2013 
       
Business Scenario 
or Travel Need 
Submit a business proposal. The 
need for a hotel room is uncertain. 
A decision regarding the proposal is 
made. The need for a hotel room is 
clear or the likelihood of travel evolves. 
A trip is made and the guest checks 
in the hotel, if travel is necessary.  
Reservation 
Schedule 
Make a reservation with a non-
refundable r according to 
probability of business needs 
Revise the reservation  
with updated probability  Pay room rate h at the check-in 
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Table 3: A numerical example of reservation pricing scheme 
Probability of Business Needs  Close to 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Almost 100% 
Reservation Price (Pay at t=0) $0  $1  $2  $5  $8  $12  $18  $25  $32  $40  $50  
Hotel Room Rate (Pay at t=1) $200  $180  $160  $140  $120  $100  $80  $60  $40  $20  $0  
Total Cost if Guest Checks-In  
(Ignore Interest and Payment Timing) $200  $181  $162  $145  $128  $112  $98  $85  $72  $60  $50  
Analogy to Current Practices of  
Hotel Reservation  
Free Reservation:  
24-hr Cancellation Rule               
Advanced Purchase: Fully 
prepay, no change allowed 
            
 
 
 
           
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
Figure 2 An example of Current Hotel Room Rate and Reservation Practice
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Figure 1: Fee Structure 
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Figure 2-a Revenue expectations from single rate 
 
 
Figure 2-b Revenue expectations from rate fences 
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Figure 2-c Revenue expectations from general equilibrium approach 
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Figure 3 An example of current hotel room rate and reservation practice 
 
 
 
 
 
